This was a soft slab avalanche unintentionally triggered by a backcountry skier. The avalanche was medium-sized relative to the path and destructive enough to injure, bury, or kill a person. The avalanche broke on a facet-crust combination (SS-ASu-R3D2.5-O). The crown face of the avalanche was generally 2 to 3 feet deep and up to 5 feet at the deepest point. The avalanche propagated around a ridge and ran on slopes facing north through east. The avalanche was up to 1300 feet wide and ran 1400 vertical feet. Debris split around several stands of dense trees and other terrain features, resulting in several paths of flow. The avalanche ran into a narrow gully at the bottom of the path, and then down the gully following the Mineral Creek drainage. Debris spanned over 2000 feet along the gully, split into multiple piles, and was more than 20 feet deep in places. A smaller avalanche released sympathetically about 450 feet to the west, on a similar aspect near treeline (SS-ASy-R3-D2-O).

The Colorado Avalanche Information Center’s (CAIC) forecast for the area around Ophir Pass for February 20, 2025, rated the avalanche danger at Moderate (Level 2 of 5) at all elevations. The primary problem was Persistent Slab avalanches on west through north to east aspects near and above treeline and northwest through north to east aspects below treeline. The likelihood was Possible. The expected size was Small to Large (up to D2). The summary statement read:

You could trigger an avalanche on steep slopes where recent snow has settled or drifted into a cohesive slab above weaker snow. The most dangerous slopes are at upper elevations where winds have drifted snow into deeper cohesive slabs. Look for and avoid trigger points near rock outcroppings, below cliff bands, or on steep convex rolls.

If you observe cracking or collapsing, reevaluate your plan and move to a lower angle or lower elevation slope. Sticking to slopes less than about 35 degrees in steepness will reduce your risk of triggering an avalanche.

Snowfall was typical from late October to mid-November 2024. After mid-November, the general weather pattern shifted to long dry periods interrupted by large but brief storms. One large storm began on February 14, and by February 20, CAIC forecasters measured 38 inches of snow and 2.8 inches of SWE at a snow study site at Red Mountain Pass. Winds recorded during this period averaged up to 20-30 mph through most of the storm, gusting to 60 mph.

Two backcountry tourers were among the guests staying at a backcountry hut east of Ophir Pass. Rider 2 was a 41-year-old female who had spent extensive time in the backcountry and traveled on a splitboard. She had been to the hut a number of times before, was familiar with the area, and skied a terrain feature known as The Nose, between Crystal Lake and the Middle Fork of Mineral Creek, on previous trips. Skier 1 was a 40-year-old male. He was also an experienced backcountry tourer, but this was his first trip to the hut. They had toured together in the backcountry multiple times before this trip. They wore avalanche rescue transceivers and carried avalanche probes and shovels.

The pair both read the avalanche forecast on February 20. To assess the avalanche conditions, they first planned to ride east-facing terrain around the hut where the slope angle was generally less than 30 degrees. Then, they planned to ascend a wind-scoured ridge on the north side of The Nose and descend the long, east-facing slope that terminates at the confluence of two branches of Mineral Creek. This slope was steeper, 35 to 40 degrees, than the terrain they would initially ski. Another party at the hut skied east-facing terrain near The Nose earlier in the day on February 20 and reported good surface conditions.

The pair made multiple ski runs on the lower-angle east-facing terrain. They observed no signs of instability. Then, they ascended the wind-scoured ridge. They took a brief break when they reached the ridgeline above The Nose. They worked their way along the ridge to a point above their intended descent of the east-facing slope.

Skier 1 began a transceiver search. He followed the bed surface of the avalanche down the fall line he had started descending. He reached the avalanche debris in the gully without acquiring a transceiver signal. He transitioned to uphill travel and ascended the avalanche path to search additional areas. Skier 1 began a second search pattern and acquired a signal with a reading between 50 and 60 meters. He followed the signal to a point about 1350 vertical feet downhill from their starting point. His transceiver read 1.5 meters, and he got a positive probe strike. Skier 1 began digging.

While Skier 1 was searching, two workers (Rescuers 1 and 2) at the nearby hut saw the fresh avalanche and began a rescue. Both Skier 1 and Rescuers 1 and 2 sent SOS messages from their respective InReach satellite messengers around 1 PM. Those messages initiated a search and rescue response. When Rescuers 1 and 2 reached the avalanche area, they began a transceiver search in the lower portions of the debris field near the confluence of the two forks.

By this point, Skier 1 had dug down to Rider 2’s face, but she was not breathing and he could not find a pulse. Rescuers 1 and 2 came into view; they shouted and established contact with Skier 1. Rescuer 1 assisted Skier 1 with digging while Rescuer 2 acted as a lookout above the gully terrain trap.

The pair fully excavated Rider 2 after about 45 to 60 minutes of digging and about 90 minutes after the avalanche. She was buried about 6 feet deep. As they removed Rider 2 from the debris, Silverton Medical Rescue arrived. Rescuers moved Rider 2 out of the gully and provided care. A helicopter flew her to Silverton.

All of the fatal avalanche accidents we investigate are tragic events. We do our best to describe each accident to help the people involved, and the community as a whole, better understand them. We offer the following comments in the hope that they will help people avoid future avalanche accidents.

The avalanche broke around the ridge and ran on slopes facing north through east. The flow split into several fingers around trees and terrain features as it ran. This resulted in essentially a triangular-shaped avalanche with debris spread over 2000 feet in several piles. The debris piled deep in the narrow gullies of the creekbed, and in places, even flowed down the gully. The result was an extensive search area with slow, challenging travel. It took Skier 1 about an hour to locate Rider 2 and clear her airway because of the massive area to search and burial depth over a meter.

Avalanche safety emphasizes traveling from safe spot to safe spot and only placing one person in avalanche terrain at a time. While we can never determine the exact events, investigators see two possibilities for why Rider 2 was caught in the avalanche. If she was standing in a location they assessed as safe, the slide must have broken above their presumed safe spot. Alternatively, Rider 2 may have moved onto the slope, possibly to keep Skier 1 in view, and was then below the crown when the avalanche released.

The Nose was the site of a fatal avalanche on February 2, 2021. The avalanches broke to a similar extent (Figure 8, below). The 2021 avalanche was triggered from the gully, and the resulting burials were 10 to 20 feet deep. Rider 2 was caught near the top of the avalanche. She was buried under about 6 feet of snow, but the debris in the gully was up to 20 feet deep.