The avalanche occurred at 7400 feet on a northwest slope of Mt Bailey, in Douglas County, OR (Figure 1, 2, 3). The involved party was a commercial cat skiing group consisting of 3 guides and 10 clients. The avalanche was likely triggered by the 7th rider to descend the slope. Five of the six previous riders were caught in the avalanche. One individual was buried completely and killed. Two more were buried partially, one sustained minor injuries and one was unharmed. The remaining two were struck by the moving snow, but were not buried or injured.

The avalanche was a D2 Storm Slab that measured approximately 70 cm deep, 200 ft. wide, and ran 700 vertical feet (Figure 4, 5). The crown height varied from one meter in some spots to 30 cm in others. The start zone is an open gully feature with a slope angle of 45 degrees. The track has clusters of trees.

Avalanche Forecast
There is no public avalanche forecast for Mt Bailey or the surrounding region. The Central Oregon Avalanche Center lies about 60 miles to the North of Mt Bailey, and forecast Considerable danger for March 13. The Mount Shasta Avalanche Center lies about 120 miles to the South of Mt Bailey, and forecast High avalanche danger on March 13. Both forecasts described storm and wind slab avalanches as likely.

Pertinent Weather & Snowpack

This summary relies in part on records from the Central OR Avalanche Center which lies to the North of Mt Bailey. It is assumed that the major weather events occurred in both regions.

It rained very hard on Sunday, February 23. The storm gradually cooled and finished with snowfall for most higher elevations, and left a distinct crust between the older, wetter snow and the new snow. Additional snow fell during the first week of March. A major winter storm began late on March 11th/early on March 12th. Although weather station data is limited in this region, the Crater Lake Rim (Station: CL002, Elevation: 7050) reported approximately 14 inches of storm snow by 1800 on March 13th.

Both the guides and clients reported intermittent snow, at times heavy, falling during the day. It was snowing when the avalanche occurred.

The avalanche start zone was very likely wind loaded. The avalanche failed and ran on a layer of small rounding facets above the February 23 rain crust. The crown profile consisted of variable layering of 4 finger and fist hard storm snow, and wind deposited snow.

Events Leading to the Accident

SWS Mountain Guides began operating Cat Ski Mount Bailey in collaboration with Diamond Lake Resort during the winter of 2023/24. Their first season saw limited operations due to poor snow conditions. Cat Ski Mount Bailey does not conduct explosive testing or avalanche mitigation. Rather, they rely upon snowpack assessment and terrain choices based on daily hazard evaluation. They typically operate on Mt Bailey three days each week. In addition to the cat ski operation, SWS Mountain Guides offers avalanche education courses in the terrain.

The group met at the Three Lakes Snowpark at approximately 0800 on March 13, 2025. The group consisted of three guides from Cat Ski Mount Bailey, and 10 clients. All three guides have completed a PRO 1 avalanche course. Every rider on the trip either had or was provided with an avalanche beacon, shovel and probe. Some had avalanche airbags. Although the guides discussed the current avalanche conditions with the clients, the details of the discussion are unclear.

The party rode three different slopes during the day. The guides dug a snow profile and performed an ECT to a depth of 1 meter with no propagation observed. The location of this snow profile is unknown to the reporter at the time of this report.

The run where the avalanche occurred was the 4th and intended last run of the day.

Accident Summary The group rode from the drop-off site to the top of the avalanche path shortly after 1500. They were positioned at the top of the slope on the skiers’ left side of the avalanche path. The 1st rider (guide) placed a ski cut across the slope to skiers’ right. A second guide positioned himself high and skiers’ right of the slope, but did not descend. Rider 1 (guide) descended the slope. Riders two through five (all clients) rode the slope without incident. Rider 6 (client) descended and was nearing the bottom when the slide occurred. Rider 7 (client) had begun his descent and likely triggered the avalanche (In interviews, rider 7 reported seeing crack propagation as he skied across the start zone). He was able to stay above the fracture.

At the time of the avalanche, riders 1-6 were beneath or near the bottom of the slope. Two guides and five clients remained at the top of the slope.

Specifically: Rider 1 (guide) and rider 5 (client) were in the runout zone. Rider 1 was able to deploy his avalanche airbag, but both of these individuals were partially buried by the avalanche. Rider 6 was still descending, nearing the bottom of the slope, and was overtaken and buried by the avalanche. Riders 2, 3, and 4 were positioned at the edge of the runout to the skiers' left. Riders 2 and 3 were knocked off their feet but not buried, and rider 4 was able to avoid being caught by riding away as he saw the avalanche coming.

Rescue Summary

The partially buried guide was able to self-extricate and radioed the remaining riders at the top of the slope. A second guide descended, while the third guide remained at the top of the slope with the remaining clients. Meanwhile, rider 4 (client) was able to roughly locate rider 6 with his beacon but did not complete a pinpoint search. The guide (rider 1, who had at this point extricated himself) completed a pinpoint search and was able to get a positive probe strike. The group extricated rider 6. It is unclear to the reporter whether signs of life were detected initially, but CPR was initiated soon after extrication. Rider 5 (partially buried) was extricated concurrently. He reported abdominal pain. It is unclear who was involved in helping to extricate rider 5.

The guides reported both difficult visibility because of heavy snowfall, and difficult radio communications, possibly due to snow in radio mics.

The third guide descended with the remaining clients, and one of the clients called 911, approximately 30 min. after the avalanche occurred.

CPR on rider 6 was discontinued at approximately 1615. The group decided to conduct the recovery together and transported the deceased individual back to the snow cat with an improvised rescue sled. They arrived at the snow cat at approximately 1915 and to the snow park and waiting ambulance at 2000.